Councillor Noel Hadjimichael stepped forward to open the evening. My name is Councillor Noel Hadjimichael. I am the chair of the Defence and Security Circle here at the club, he said. The National Liberal Club is the heart of British liberalism, but the Defence and Security Circle is everyone on Team GB. He explained that members came from every major political party, from the civil service, from the private and non profit sectors. His voice carried a clear sense of ritual as he noted that this was the one hundred and fifty ninth event in five and a half years and that the overriding theme of their gatherings was the United Kingdom national interest.

Before the speakers began he offered instructions familiar to anyone accustomed to Westminster committee rooms. Please please please turn your phones to dead, to stunned, to silent, he said. The bar would reopen in an hour. They had the room until half past eight. Make new friends tonight, but for the next hour listen think and finally vote.

He introduced the chair of the debate as the most powerful of the seven at the front. Zagham Farhan rose with a half smile that suggested equal measures of affection and mischief. Thank you Noel, he said. I was once upon a time president of the Oxford Liberal Democrats. I am going to be chairing tonight. I am also the secretary of the Liberal Democrat Friends of the Armed Forces, so I am going to be chairing this debate with the neutrality of a member of the Royal Opposition this evening.

Farhan gestured around the room and spoke warmly of the club that had hosted them several times before. I love this place, he said, because at the top of the stairs is a photo of Dadabhai Naoroji, who was elected to the House of Commons in 1892, and I think that says something very very special about our country and this club, that someone who looks like me was able to be in the Parliament a few kilometres down the road one hundred and fifty years ago. I think that is very very special.

He then outlined the rules. Eight minute speeches. No interventions in the first or last minute. In the six minutes between, audience members could rise and call P O I2, waiting for permission to continue. Keep them short, he warned. Ten words perhaps. Please do not give a speech of your own. A gavel rested on the floor if needed. At the end of the night, a vote of thanks would come from Jennifer Schwarzenberg, vice chair of the circle.

With the room attentive, Farhan introduced the opening speaker. The Right Honourable Lord Newby, leader of the Liberal Democrats in the House of Lords until very recently, former government deputy chief whip, and honorary chair of Oxford Students Liberal Association, stood to make the case for the proposition that this House believes defence should be the national priority.

Thank you Chair, Lord Newby began. At one level, this is a pointless debate. Because it is a political truism, accepted by all parties, that the security and defence of the country is always at the centre of its concerns, and its top priority. Yet he said that Britain had behaved otherwise for most of his lifetime, steadily reducing defence spending from a high point he placed at 52 per cent of GDP in 1945 to 13 per cent in 1953 and to 5.8 per cent a decade later. By 1993 it had fallen to 3.5 per cent. In 2023 it was a mere 2.1 per cent.

As demands for health education and pensions grew, governments had treated defence as expendable, the peace dividend that they eagerly spent. He said this had been the prevailing consensus with only senior military figures dissenting and that their warnings had been dismissed as special pleading.

That world, he said, no longer existed. The new Strategic Defence Review declared that the United Kingdom was already under attack from espionage cyber intrusion and information manipulation. China, Russia, Iran and North Korea were named as principal offenders. The war in Ukraine, fought on the European doorstep, had made this threat visible. At the same time, Lord Newby said, the United States administration had made it clear that for the first time in eighty years Europe could not rely on Washington to fund its defence.

He turned to technology with the precision of someone accustomed to committee briefings. We have seen how drones, considered of little use in battle at all a few years ago, are now dominating the fighting in Ukraine, he said. Cyber attacks, unheard of a decade ago, are now an everyday threat. Artificial intelligence was transforming military decision making.

He mocked the belief under Boris Johnson that Britain could pivot to the east and act as a global naval presence. That was delusional, he said. The United Kingdom did not have those resources. A NATO first focus on Europe was not only wiser but essential.

Yet the challenge was not simply external. Procurement itself had been defective for years. As a warning he pointed to an armoured vehicle programme that was eight years late and hundreds of millions of pounds over budget. If Britain was to spend more on defence, it had to do so competently.

But the core difficulty, he said, would be persuading the public that higher defence spending was necessary when other services were stretched and trust in government was low. Many threats were intangible and unseen. Yet it was imperative for the public to accept the reality of them. Defence must be a national priority. As citizens we now need to accept it and also accept the consequences.

When he sat down the room shifted to the opposition side where Owen Wilson rose. He had been introduced earlier as secretary from Warwick and now he opened with a clear rejection of the premise. Not only do I not think that defence should be the national priority, I do not even think that it should be the priority in protecting British interests, he said.

He reminded the room that Britain was projected to spend 60 point 2 billion pounds on defence this year. What do we really get for that, he asked. This country no longer has a British army standing by that regularly goes into a conflict and fights for so called Western social value democracy and liberty. Iraq and Afghanistan had shown that Britain could no longer dictate world events by force.

He turned to the promises already made. Committing to 2 point 5 per cent of national income on defence by 2027 and later 3 per cent struck him as a poor allocation of limited resources. Better avenues existed to advance British interests.

The most obvious, he said, was soft power. An obvious example to bring up in the context of this week is the BBC, he said. We have an American president now threatening to sue our public broadcaster. According to YouGov the BBC is the second most trusted news organisation in America, only after the Weather Channel. There was laughter in the room. Through the BBC World Service, he continued, it reaches 450 million people weekly and is ranked first for reliability among international news providers.

In a landscape where misinformation was widespread, especially from the United States president whom he described as constantly lying, the BBC provided a counterweight. In many countries where impartial news was impossible to access, the World Service offered a more objective view. And for all this influence its cost was modest. The World Service cost the government 137 million pounds. The licence fee was 3 point 66 billion. All of it dwarfed by the 60 billion spent on defence.

When pressed from the floor about the value of defence related trade such as British aircraft sales to Turkey, Wilson acknowledged that such ventures had benefits. But the question before them, he said, was priority. He argued instead for international development, criticising the government plan to reduce aid from 0 point 5 per cent of national income to 0 point 3 per cent by 2027 in order to help fund increased defence spending. Have we not got a moral duty as a leading Western nation to promote our values not just by force, but by funding the fight against AIDS tuberculosis and malaria, but on water sanitation and education, he asked.

Wilson then turned to geopolitics. Africa would account for a large share of global population growth by the end of the century. If Britain wanted influence there, it would achieve it through aid education and stable institutions. Age provides a better value for money breakdown, he said. Britain would grow less relevant if it abandoned this space.

He then invoked another instrument of soft power. The monarchy costs 132 point 1 million pounds through the sovereign grant, he said. But when one included the Crown Estate and the wider economic gains from royal diplomacy it might be a net benefit. Our commitment to higher defence may lead to current American tensions today, but you never see pacified, he said. The monarchy on the other hand is something we have got again and again without too much expense.

He closed by turning to universities. According to a report from February this year, 50 world leaders went to universities in the United Kingdom, he said. Heads of state and government possessed a sense of respect towards this country by merit of that education. On this measure Britain was ahead even of the United States. Yet universities were financially vulnerable. Should the government not protect them rather than attack them through fee regimes, he asked. Our universities are driving our service based economy and maintaining British influence through well trained elites, he said. For every penny invested inside a university Britain makes a tangible gain. The state could not always say the same of expanded defence budgets. Therefore the idea that defence should be the national priority, he said, belonged to another era.

The debate then returned to the proposition benches where Teo Sevgen spoke in a separate capacity from his earlier institutional introduction. He began by acknowledging the threats from foreign authoritarianism but insisted that the deeper danger came from discontent at home. People are dissatisfied with how this country is going, he said. They feel poorer. They feel they do not have as much material goods as they used to. Polling had shown that a fifth of young adults preferred dictatorship to democracy. Support for Reform UK hovered near 31 per cent in some surveys. Demagogues would thrive, he said, if people saw their own services cut in order to send money abroad. While he believed supporting Ukraine was vital, he feared that domestic hardship would fuel hostility to international commitments.

From the floor a member asked whether better communication could help, suggesting a commissioner for rearmament and resilience. Sevgen replied cautiously. Yes I agree, he said. But he doubted that reframing would solve the core problem. Another questioner asked if Britain should buy cheaper Russian oil to fund domestic services. He rejected the idea outright. That would fund the war effort of an autocratic dictator, he said. Instead Britain should invest in new energy sources at home.

He argued that Russian information campaigns succeeded only when they exploited existing grievances. If these bots are saying the country is going to pot, we need to think, why do people think the country is going to pot if they do not listen to them, he said. The answer in his view was repeated. It was because their lives were getting worse. And that could be changed only through investment in public services. National defence should be a focus, he concluded. But it should not absolutely not be the priority.

A later proposition voice, Theo Cunningham from Oxford, rose with a different tone. Distinguished guests, he began. I think it is clear that the world is changing. He said the earlier speakers had asked the right questions. What does this look like. Where is this money being spent. What are the threats. And why are we spending it. He argued that in the United Kingdom economy stability depended on the reliability of global systems. Britain was the biggest net importer aside from the United States. That means that we rely on other countries more than anyone else in terms of value for our economy to continue, he said. We cannot survive in isolation.

He pointed to the speed of technological change. The United States and China were spending hundreds of billions. Russia was attacking the United Kingdom online and damaging underwater cables. It is clear that Russia are infringing on the UK capacity to survive, he said. They are attacking us online.

An opposition voice challenged him on corruption in defence procurement. How can you say that we need defence spending when we have got huge contracts that are deeply inefficient or completely corrupt, the questioner asked. Cunningham replied. At the point where you prioritise these things, because you put more effort into getting a good contract, he said. And he argued that new technologies discovered for defence often diffused into civilian life. Presumably the iPhone is a consumer good, he said. It required a lot of technology to get made.

He acknowledged the importance of soft power but said it depended on security. No one on his side wanted to destroy the BBC, he said. But money had to come from somewhere, perhaps uncomfortable options like higher income tax. The question was stability. If defence spending increased stability, he said, the markets would likely accept it.

He ended with a question. What does this country look like in twenty years, and how do we secure that future. If you think that this country faces threats that all speakers have acknowledged, then you probably have to think that we have to do something about these threats, he said. For these reasons, I am very proud to say you should vote for the motion.

The final speech came from Jack Peters of Cambridge for the opposition. He began by complimenting the earlier speakers and then turned to economic fundamentals. Strength, he said, came not from military budgets alone but from a thriving economy, innovation and capable civil institutions. He criticised what he called the Roman maxim3 invoked implicitly by the proposition. If you want peace, prepare for war. That world, he said, no longer existed. The modern world was defined by a global system of capitalism, free trade and institutional expectations that citizens had for welfare and freedom.

Within that settlement, he argued, the postwar decades had seen rising prosperity and a decline in war deaths. Defence did not exist separately from these foundations. Defence exists on these pillars, he said. These are pillars of modernity. These are pillars of the post war world economy.

In prioritising defence he warned that Britain would actively take money away from the forces that enabled long term security. Raising income taxes without regard for innovation would undermine the very industries defence depended on. Spending more now meant weakening the future base.

He then reached for historical cases. The Soviet Union spent 12 to 17 per cent of its GDP on defence. What did that do, he asked. It drove economic stagnation and left the state unable to sustain its military. Similarly, he contrasted North Korea and South Korea. The latter prioritised growth and ended up with one of the most technologically advanced militaries in the world. A questioner reminded him that South Korea had also faced dictatorship and defence pressures. Peters replied that the principle remained. South Korea recognised the threat and invested in growth because it recognised the threat.

He closed by clarifying his stance. This is not saying we should be cutting defence spending, he said. What we are saying is you have to understand what enables defence spending in the first place. And that cannot be suddenly removed.

When the last speech ended Farhan reached again for the gavel and called the room to order. A vote of thanks followed from Jennifer Schwarzenberg, who praised the range of ideas and spoke of the tension between insurance protection preservation and immediate stability. She thanked the speakers for bringing the room on that journey and added with a smile, as an American, thank you to the Weather Channel.

Then came the count. I have a result, how exciting, Farhan said. For the proposition 29 and for the opposition 31. The opposition has it. A ripple of applause ran through the room. Twenty people had not voted at all.

Hadjimichael returned to close the evening. This is a gentle advertisement, he said. There is a bar over there. It will be open for some time. He invited guests to stay or to depart safely to trains buses or what he called their carriages. Every one of the eighty two people in this room has a home at the Defence and Security Circle, he added. He reminded them that on 24 November they would hold their one hundred and sixtieth event, a Situation Room discussion with the Gunpowder Chronicles. Be part of the conversation here at the National Liberal Club, he said. You are more than welcome.

The audience drifted towards the bar and the staircase. The portraits remained where they had always been, presiding over another debate in a building that had watched British politics for more than a century. The vote had been close. The arguments were unresolved. But the question of how Britain balances strained services, fraying global alliances and an increasingly dangerous technological battlefield lingered in the air long after the chairs were stacked and the room finally emptied.

Gunpowder Chronicles

A Quiet Debate at the Edge of War

The staircase in the National Liberal Club did not simply creak that November night. It sounded like a warning…

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6 months ago · 2 likes · Vudi Xhymshiti

“This House believes that the Banjska attack in the Republic of Kosovo on 24 September 2023 is direct proof that Europe’s support for Serbia undermines democracy and security in the region.”

What followed was not a polite seminar but a collision of perspectives. Three panelists Dr Aidan Hehir, an international relations scholar, Ian Cameron Cliff, former British Ambassador in Pristina, and Vudi Xhymshiti, journalist and Editor-In-Chief of the Gunpowder Chronicles, brought not only different readings of Kosovo’s fragility but different instincts about Europe itself.

The scholar: appeasement as pathology

Hehir spoke with the crisp insistence of someone long exasperated by policy that mistakes patience for strategy.

“Serbia,” he said, “has spent more than a decade systematically undermining Kosovo’s sovereignty, both internally and externally.” He cited Belgrade’s campaigns to block Kosovo’s membership in UNESCO and Interpol, the chokehold of the Serbian List party in northern municipalities, and the steady “chipping away” at sovereignty that most Western capitals seemed to accept as background noise.

“The Banjska attack is not an outlier,” he insisted, “it is the natural outcome of indulgence. Appeasement has become a psychosis: you convince yourself that escalation is actually progress. There’s a point where policymakers become constitutionally incapable of recognising that their approach is making the situation worse.”

When Hehir described seeing Milan Radoicic, the organiser of the Banjska attacks, “walking around Belgrade as if nothing had happened,” the audience stirred. “What signal does that send? If you can attempt to kill Kosovo police officers, organise an armed incursion, and still roam free, what message does Europe give to the next man planning violence?”

The diplomat: sovereignty and its optics

Ambassador Cliff, lean and deliberate, opened not with denial but with a constraint: “The European Union acts in Kosovo with one arm tied behind its back. Five member states do not recognise Kosovo. That is not a minor problem; it shapes everything.”

He acknowledged that Banjska was “the most serious incident since 1999” and admitted it was “very hard to believe President Vucic knew nothing of what was planned.” But he pressed the case for political tact in Kosovo’s north.

“Yes, the elections were legal,” he said of the May 2023 local votes boycotted by Serbs. “But when ninety-eight percent of one community stay home, legitimacy is in question. Sending newly elected mayors into barricaded municipal buildings may have been lawful, but politically, it was inept. It was a red rag to a bull.”

Cliff did not dispute Kosovo’s right to enforce sovereignty. His warning was subtler: sovereignty exercised without choreography could alienate allies and give ammunition to adversaries. “In divided societies,” he said, “it is not just what you do, but how you do it that matters.”

The journalist: Banjska as Crimea’s echo

Where Hehir indicted appeasement and Cliff urged calibration, Vudi Xhymshiti issued a stark warning: Banjska was not a Balkan anomaly, it was a Kremlin echo1.

“Quite who was behind it is clear enough,” he said. “Vucic runs a government that knew what was planned. To pretend otherwise is to indulge a dangerous fiction.”2

Then came the pivot:

“What Vucic attempted in Banjska is what Putin did in Crimea in 2014—stage an incident, claim a minority is endangered, and prepare the ground for annexation. The West must put an end to this now, before we see the escalation we all witnessed in 2022 in Ukraine.”

The comparison unsettled some in the audience. One voice asked, “Do you really believe Serbia would launch a full-scale invasion?” Xhymshiti did not flinch. “If left unchecked, yes. Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014—each time the West said ‘not now, not yet’. That indulgence produced 2022. If Europe repeats the pattern in Kosovo, the outcome will be the same.”

For him, the debate was not abstract. It was a warning that Western missteps in the Balkans could seed the next continental crisis.

The Hague and the memory war

The discussion turned to the Special Chambers in The Hague, the Kosovo war-crimes tribunal. Hehir asked bluntly why a sixth judicial forum was needed when the ICTY, UNMIK, EULEX, and Kosovo’s own courts already existed. “It looks,” he argued, “like justice pursued until the desired verdict appears.”

Cliff countered that Kosovo had little choice: “Without such a court, pressure would have mounted to return the issue to the United Nations Security Council—where Russia and China would hold the pen. The Special Chambers was the least-worst option.”

Here Xhymshiti pressed the point. “The Special Court’s mandate is not to criminalise Kosovo’s independence or the KLA as a whole, but to bring accountability for specific individuals accused of grave crimes, political killings, enforced disappearances, abuses that cannot be ignored. It is important to be clear: this is about justice for victims, not about delegitimising the state of Kosovo or its struggle for freedom.”

Washington, Brussels, and lithium

The panel converged on one conclusion: Europe’s reaction to Banjska was insufficient. “Sanctions should have been automatic,” Hehir said. “Instead, we got ambiguity.” Cliff agreed: “The EU should have treated this with far more seriousness.”

Xhymshiti advanced a harder claim: “Serbia is indulged not only for its supposed regional role, but because of what it has underground. Lithium. The United States and Europe are willing to look the other way if Belgrade promises to be a supplier.”

The line sparked audible dissent in the audience. A young man asked Hehir whether appeasement could at least be seen as rational hedging. Hehir shot back: “Appeasement is never rational. It’s a delusion that mistakes emboldening for stability.”

The mood in the room

Michael Sheppard, guiding the discussion with calm insistence, repeatedly pressed the panel to define their terms. What, exactly, is appeasement? What is sovereignty? What counts as proof of state complicity? His interventions kept the debate taut, ensuring each claim met counterclaim.

By the close, consensus had shifted. Even Cliff, the career diplomat, had conceded that Vucic “almost certainly knew” about Banjska and that Europe’s response was “a missed test of seriousness.” Hehir had etched appeasement as pathology. And Xhymshiti had planted the Crimea parallel so firmly that it lingered in post-debate conversations at the bar.

What shifted

This was no formal chamber with votes tallied, but persuasion could be felt in the air.

• Appeasement lost its defenders: Even those urging caution conceded Europe had indulged Serbia too long.

• Sovereignty gained clarity: What began as abstractions—license plates, municipal councils, police uniforms—became understood as the sinews of statehood.

• The Russian parallel stuck: Banjska would now be remembered less as a Balkan firefight than as a test case in Moscow’s playbook.

Lessons for policymakers

1. Raise the cost of deniability: Serbia’s EU path should hinge on credible cooperation with Banjska investigations.

2. Fix the EU veto problem: Five non-recognisers distort every policy and embolden Belgrade.

3. Counter narrative asymmetry. Disinformation about Kosovo’s legitimacy is as dangerous as weapons stockpiles.

4. Recognise appeasement’s cost: Banjska, like Crimea, shows how indulgence turns into invasion.

The line that lingers

“The greatest single threat to peace and security in the Balkans, apart from Russia, is Serbian nationalism,” Hehir declared. Cliff did not endorse the sentence, but he did not contest it either.

Xhymshiti’s closing words tied the strands together:

“If the West continues to appease Belgrade, Banjska will not be remembered as an isolated act of terror. It will be remembered as the rehearsal for a war—just as Crimea was for Ukraine.”

The Situation Room had promised a chamber where evidence would be stress-tested. On its first night, the evidence stressed one conclusion: Banjska should have been the hinge moment. That it wasn’t is precisely the problem to fix.

Gunpowder Chronicles

Kosovo’s Institutions Play Putin’s Balkan Game

Democracy is not meant to be a suicide pact. When a young state faces an orchestrated campaign to hollow out its institutions, the first duty of its bodies is to defend the constitutional order. Kosovo’s Election Complaints and Appeals Panel (ECAP) has now done the opposite. In late August, ECAP ordered the Central Election Commission (CEC) to certify…

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8 months ago · 2 likes · Vudi Xhymshiti and Or Karny-Muñoz

This is where every debate begins: with facts, not noise. Our Briefings are concise, neutral context reports drawn from expert analysis and original reporting. They establish the shared “ground truth” behind each of Europe’s most urgent questions, so when the debate starts, everyone begins on the same page.

Today marks our inaugural debate: “The Balkans on the Brink: Kosovo, Serbia, and the West.” Two years after the Banjska attack in northern Kosovo, questions of accountability, militarisation, and Western policy remain unresolved.

Reserve Your Spot Today

These three briefs, in English and Albanian, provide the essential background: Serbia’s trajectory since Banjska, Britain’s real frontline against Moscow, and how regional silence has shaped the balance of power.

Serbia After Banjska: Guns, Gas, and Russian Leverage

Michael Sheppard & Vudi Xhymshiti, Gunpowder Chronicles — Sep 24, 2025.

Two years after the 2023 Banjska attack in northern Kosovo, Serbia has emerged more militarised, energy-bound to Russia, and reliant on Moscow’s intelligence support, while Western responses remain fragmented.

On accountability, Kosovo indicted 45 suspects, including Milan Radoicic, for organising the Banjska assault that killed police officer Afrim Bunjaku. Belgrade has not extradited him. Western governments have issued statements and sanctions designations, but neither the EU, UK nor US has published a dedicated investigative report.

Security has been recalibrated. NATO reinforced its KFOR mission, with British troops regularly rotated to deter further violence. Serbia, meanwhile, expanded its arsenal: buying French Rafale jets, integrating Chinese FK-3 air defences, and adding Russian-origin Mi-35 helicopters, while continuing energy dependence through Gazprom contracts. This eclectic procurement both maintains ties with Moscow and Beijing while hedging with select Western purchases.

Diplomatically, President Vucic continues to balance optics. Serbia voted for a UN Ukraine resolution in February 2025 before retracting support. Belgrade has also deepened security links with Moscow: Serbia’s deputy prime minister thanked Russian intelligence for protest management, while the controversial Russia-Serbia “Humanitarian Center” in Niš remains a concern in Brussels.

For the UK, Serbia’s posture presents three risks: direct exposure of British soldiers in KFOR, weakened sanctions enforcement due to Serbian energy ties, and intelligence vulnerabilities on NATO’s periphery. EU institutions have sharpened their language, linking Serbia’s accountability failures and Russia/China ties to enlargement risks.

Key developments to watch include whether Belgrade extradites suspects, how Rafale deliveries shift leverage with Paris, and whether the EU or UK moves from declaratory pressure to conditionality.

👉 Read full article

Kosovo, Not Serbia, Is Britain’s Front Line Against Moscow

Vudi Xhymshiti, Gunpowder Chronicles — Sep 24, 2025

This article argues that the lessons of Banjska are not limited to Kosovo but to Europe’s strategic landscape: Ukraine is Russia’s eastern front of conquest; Kosovo is its western laboratory of infiltration.

Serbia, under President Vucic, is described as firmly tied into Moscow’s energy infrastructure, Beijing’s arms supply, and Russian intelligence. Belgrade’s claims of “balancing” between East and West are portrayed as tactical theatre. French Rafales or EU membership overtures are presented as bargaining chips, while structural dependence on Russia and China deepens.

Kosovo, by contrast, is positioned as the only fully Western-aligned state in the Western Balkans, simultaneously defending its sovereignty and confronting hybrid threats: disinformation, psychological warfare, and media controlled by Belgrade. The article draws parallels with Britain’s shutdown of RT and Sputnik after 2022, urging similar action in Kosovo to curb hostile influence operations.

The piece highlights the upcoming Western Balkans Conference in London (Oct 22, 2025) as a pivotal moment. It calls on the UK to end indulgence of Belgrade’s “double game” and reaffirm Kosovo as Britain’s natural ally, drawing a parallel with Tony Blair’s 1999 intervention. For Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the choice is framed as whether to apply sanctions and conditions or risk repeating the appeasement that preceded Russia’s seizure of Crimea.

The article warns that British soldiers in KFOR, markets vulnerable to sanctions leakage, and domestic politics exposed to disinformation mean this is not “distant geopolitics.” Britain must act decisively, recognising Kosovo as the real frontline of Europe’s confrontation with Moscow.

👉 Read full article

Dy vjet pas Banjës, kufiri i padukshëm i Evropës

Vudi Xhymshiti, Gunpowder Chronicles (Albanian) — Sep 24, 2025

Written in Albanian, this article situates Kosovo at the centre of Europe’s struggle against Russian influence, while criticising Serbia’s trajectory and Albania’s political stance.

It argues that two years after Banjska, Serbia has chosen alignment with Moscow and Beijing, while continuing to present neutrality as a façade. Kosovo, meanwhile, stands largely alone in resisting Belgrade-backed paramilitaries and Russian-style disinformation campaigns.

Britain is urged to treat Kosovo as a frontline ally, as it once did in 1999, while Albania under Prime Minister Edi Rama is accused of abandoning its historical role as Kosovo’s defender. Specific moments cited include:

• Silence on the 2018 partition plan,

• The “Mini-Schengen” initiative excluding Kosovo,

• Weak responses to the 2023 Banjska attack,

• Independent proposals on Serb-majority municipalities bypassing Prishtina, and

• The appointment of controversial figures in Albanian intelligence.

This trajectory is presented as enabling Serbia’s narrative in Brussels and Washington. By contrast, Kosovo is faulted for failing to counter hostile propaganda networks internally, leaving its democratic space vulnerable.

The piece concludes that Kosovo now carries the burden of Europe’s invisible frontier, while Albania risks complicity through silence and accommodation. For the author, the true European border runs not through Warsaw or Lviv, but through Leposaviq, Zvečan, Mitrovica, and Banjska.

👉 Lexo artikullin e plotë

Reserve Your Spot Now

The Balkans are once again at a crossroads. With weapons caches uncovered in northern Kosovo and Europe’s uneasy stance toward Serbia under scrutiny, the question is urgent:

This House believes that the Banjska attack in the Republic of Kosovo on September 24, 2023, is direct proof that Europe’s support for Serbia undermines democracy and security in the region.

This inaugural Situation Room debate will test that claim in a format unlike any other: sharp, adversarial, and grounded in evidence.

Gunpowder Chronicles

One Year After Banjska: The West’s Role in Serbia’s Balkan Escalation

One year after Serbia’s brazen attempt to annex northern Kosovo in a Kremlin-inspired operation, the situation in the Western Balkans has deteriorated further. The Serbian state, emboldened by Western appeasement and free from accountability, has openly embraced the toxic influence of Russia, China, and Iran, dragging the region deeper into instability. As of September 24, 2024, Serbia now…

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2 years ago · 4 likes · Vudi Xhymshiti

What to Expect

• 🎙 Expert voices: Diplomats, academics, and practitioners with deep Balkan experience.

• 🗳 Audience power: Vote before and after to track persuasion shifts.

• ⚡ Dynamic debate: No long speeches, just clarity, rebuttal, and pressure.

• 🌍 Context that matters: Every debate begins with a crisis briefing.

• 🤝 Engagement: Network with thinkers, journalists, policymakers, and peers.

Speakers

• Dr. Aidan Hehir: Reader in International Relations, University of Westminster

• Ian Cameron Cliff, OBE: Former British Ambassador to Bosnia, Sudan, Kosovo, and Croatia

• Ilir Kapiti: Ambassador of the Republic of Kosovo to the UK

• Vudi Xhymshiti: Founder & Editor-in-Chief, The Gunpowder Chronicles

Moderator: Michael Sheppard, London Editor, The Gunpowder Chronicles

This is not a lecture. It’s an intelligence chamber where diplomacy, strategy, and accountability are stress-tested in real time.

⚠️ Only 60 seats are available. Once the chamber closes, it closes.

👉 Secure your place today and share this event with colleagues, students, and peers who care about Europe’s future.

Reserve a Spot

Why The Situation Room?

The world faces crises where decisions carry immediate and profound consequences: war or peace, sanctions or diplomacy, justice or impunity. Too often, public discussion of these crises reduces to slogans or entrenched positions.

We built The Situation Room to be different:

• Every debate begins with a neutral fact briefing, establishing shared ground truth.

• Speakers—diplomats, academics, practitioners, and journalists, are bound by time discipline, rebuttal, and clarity.

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Our palette is intentionally sober, authoritative, and modern:

• Background #f5f6f7 → Light, neutral clarity. Like briefing paper, it represents facts and transparency.

• Accent #5a646e (Steel Gray) → Authority, seriousness, discipline, an echo of intelligence chambers and strategy boards.

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This system ensures The Situation Room looks and feels like what it is: not a talk show, but a disciplined arena for testing urgent ideas about the future of democracy, security, and peace.

Arguments are weighed on evidence, not personalities. Opposing views are engaged, not ignored. Every voice matters, with time discipline ensuring fairness and the audience empowered to challenge, question, and decide. On 24 September 2025, these principles will come alive as we host our very first debate, opening a space where ideas, not egos, lead the way.

Principles of the Room

• Respect & Civility → Arguments, not personalities.

• Clarity → Positions stated upfront, evidence over rhetoric.

• Rebuttal → Engagement with opposing views, not repetition.

• Time Discipline → No filibustering, no drift; every voice has weight.

• Audience Power → Questions, challenges, and votes shape the outcome.

Our First Debate

On 24 September 2025, the inaugural motion will test a pressing question:

“This House believes that. … led to the. … in the, undermining peace, security and democracy.